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ABSTRACT
This Essay is the first analysis of a recent entrant on the patent land-
scape: the Invalidity Assertion Entity (IAE).  IAEs engage in rent-seek-
ing by demanding payment from patent holders in exchange for not
attempting to invalidate their patents through administrative action
before the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.
The response to IAEs has been uniformly negative. Reflexive proposals
have been raised in Congress (unsurprisingly) to terminate the IAE
business model. In contrast to the common response to IAEs, this Essay
discusses how profit-driven IAEs may generate socially beneficial ex-
ternalities and why legislating to end the IAE business model is
imprudent.
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I. INTRODUCTION: PATENT LAW AND UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES
The Law of Unintended Consequences posits that any purposive activity
will have unexpected results.1 Consistent with this rule, all legislation brings
about effects the drafters did not foresee. It does not follow, however, that a
law’s unintended consequences are inherently negative.2 This Essay calls for
legislative restraint as Congress reflexively “corrects” the patent laws to
eliminate unintended results, even though the law may produce unexpected
social benefits.
Invalidity Assertion Entities (“IAEs”) were an unforeseen response to
recent amendments to the Patent Act.3 IAEs are private rent-seeking entities
that attempt to invalidate a patent if the patent-holder refuses to pay them a
demanded consideration. To this end, IAEs utilize a recently-introduced ad-
ministrative process called Inter Partes Review (“IPR”), which provides a
procedure to invalidate certain improperly issued patents. IPR was predicted
to be used by parties with business interests in the subject patent,4 so the use
of the process by IAEs—who have no business interest in the patent beyond
securing a settlement—was unexpected.
The public response to IAEs has been uniformly negative, ranging from
cries of “extortion!” to lawsuits alleging RICO violations.5 Given the general
1. See Margaret Howard, The Law of Unintended Consequences, 31 S. ILL. U. L.J. 451
(2007); William C. Rooklidge & Russell B. Hill, The Law of Unintended Consequences: The
On Sale Bar After Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, 82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 163, 164
(2000) (“Historians have oft observed the law of unintended consequences, that is, that every
action will have at least one unintended consequence.”); Tom Jerman, The Law of Unintended
Consequences: Judicial Review of NMB Decisions under the APA, in AIRLINE AND RAILROAD
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW: A COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS (A.L.I. ed., 2014) (“The law of
unintended consequences is a theory in social science that actions, particularly governmental
actions, always have effects that are unanticipated or unintended – sometimes negative conse-
quences, and sometimes positive.”).
2. Robert K. Merton, The Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social Action, 1
AM. SOC. REV. 894, 895 (1936) (“[U]ndesired effects are not always undesirable effects.”).
3. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284, 285 (Sept. 16,
2011).
4. Universal Elecs. v. Universal Remote Control, 943 F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1029 (C.D.
Cal. 2013) (quoting Changes to Implement Inter Partes Review Proceedings, Post-Grant Re-
view Proceedings, and Transitional Program for Covered Business Method Patents, 77 Fed.
Reg. 48,680 (Aug. 14, 2012) (codified at 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.100 et seq.)) (calling IPR an alterna-
tive to litigation).
5. First Amended Complaint at 10-17, Chinook Licensing DE LLC v. RozMed LLC,
(No. 14-00598), (D. Del. June 13, 2014), ECF No. 9; Michael Rosen, Patent “Trolls” Claim-
ing extortion? Not So Fast, TECHPOLICYDAILY.COM, (Dec. 23, 2013, 6:00 AM), http://www
.techpolicydaily.com/technology/patent-trolls-claiming-extortion-not-fast; Patience Haggin,
Judge Dismisses NPE’s Extortion Claims, LAW.COM (Dec. 18, 2014), http://www.law.com/
sites/articles/2014/12/18/judge-dismisses-npes-extortion-claims/.
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disdain for the rent-seeking activities of “patent trolls,”6 this reaction is not
surprising. Nor are the recent Congressional proposals to end the viability of
the IAE business model unexpected. However, IAEs may create significant
unappreciated benefits, and therefore it is imprudent to legislatively end IAE
activity before these entities are fully vetted in the literature and
marketplace.
To date, no thorough scholarly analysis of IAEs has been conducted.
This Essay engages in a novel review of this business model and discusses
how profit-driven IAEs may effect socially beneficial externalities. To be-
gin, Section II describes the IPR process, the operation of IPR and its patent-
invalidating procedures, the IAE business strategy, and the recent legislative
proposals to end IAE activity. This Section lays the groundwork for evaluat-
ing behaviors from rationally behaving IAEs and the influence that these
entities may have on the patent system.
Section III discusses the current state of knowledge regarding IAEs and
why legislative action at this time is imprudent, lest Congress undercut the
potential for socially beneficial behavior. It specifically details the available
information (or the lack thereof) regarding the current scope of IAE activi-
ties and how this information influences the appropriateness of newly pro-
posed amendments to the Patent Act. Section III further argues that IAEs
may have additional benefits including disincentivizing abusive litigation,
invalidating improperly granted patents, and reducing the high cost of de-
fending patent lawsuits. This Section concludes by highlighting further re-
search that needs to be undertaken and additional information that must be
ascertained.
Section IV addresses the current overbreadth of proposed legislation and
primary drawbacks associated with IAEs.  The Section explains why at-
tempts to use IPR to influence stock prices is not a drawback attributable to
IAEs and how the use of IPRs to influence stock prices can be legislatively
addressed without disturbing the IAE business model. Section IV also dis-
cusses the problematic potential for IAEs to seek nuisance-value settlements,
and how this hazard can be avoided by the proper functioning of the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office (the “USPTO” or “Patent Office”).
6. This sentiment was described in Alan Devlin’s Revisiting the Presumption of Patent
Validity, 37 SW. U.L. REV. 323, 348 (2008) (“‘Patent trolls’ are entities that engage in objec-
tionable rent-seeking behavior by accumulating and enforcing patent portfolios against unsus-
pecting firms that have actually marketed a technology to consumers. Little, if any, redeeming
virtue is associated with the practice—trolls do not contribute to society by marketing their
inventions and, indeed, many trolls never invented the relevant patented technology at all.”)
(citations omitted). See also Chrystal Mancuso-Smith et. al., Patent Troll Legislation-Swinging
Too Far?, 28 UTAH B.J. 21, 21 (2015) (discussing more neutral terms to describe patent
Trolls) (“Patent law, as you might imagine, is a field replete with acronyms. Examples relevant
to this article include the terms NPE (a non-practicing entity) and PAE (a patent assertion
entity). NPEs and PAEs are less pejorative terms to describe patent trolls.”).
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II. THE “PROBLEM” OF INVALIDITY ASSERTION ENTITIES
This Section introduces the IPR system and discusses how IAEs alleg-
edly misuse this process by engaging in their rent-seeking behavior. The
final subsection describes current Congressional hostility towards IAEs and
specifically describes how proposed legislation would outlaw the IAE busi-
ness model.
A. Inter Partes Review
The IPR process provides a means for challenging the validity of previ-
ously-issued patents. IPRs can be filed by almost anyone, including parties
with no immediate interest in the patent’s subject matter.7 If an IPR is suc-
cessful, the challenged patent claims are invalidated. This Essay analyzes
unforeseen consequences arising from the initiation of IPR in 2012,8 and this
Section describes how this process is conducted.
An IPR begins with a petition to the Patent Office (an “IPR petition” or
a “petition”) alleging that a patent’s claims are not valid because they were
disclosed in an earlier publication.9 A successful petition initiates an IPR in
earnest. To be granted, a petition must establish that “there is a reasonable
likelihood that [the petitioner] will prevail with respect to at least one of the
claims challenged in the request.”10 The patent-holder is afforded a written
response to the petition,11 and within a matter of months a determination is
made regarding whether to initiate an IPR.12
If an IPR is instituted, a trial-like proceeding13 is conducted by the
USPTO’s Patent Trial and Appeal Board wherein the petitioner has the bur-
den of proving that the relevant claims are not patentable by a preponder-
7. 35 U.S.C. § 311(b) (2012). IPR is unavailable to patent infringement defendants
(and parties in privity thereto) against whom the subject patent has been asserted in a lawsuit
filed more than one year before filing of the petition. 37 C.F.R. § 42.101 (2015).
8. Jason Scott Tiedeman et al., Declaratory Judgment Actions, Covenants Not to Sue,
and Bad Patents: A Call to Allow the Judiciary to Weed Out Bad Patents While Adhering to
the “Case or Controversy” Requirement, 13 J. HIGH TECH. L. 1 (2012) (IPR became available
on September 16, 2012.).
9. 35 U.S.C. § 311(a–b) (2012); Christopher C. Kennedy, Rethinking Obviousness,
2015 WIS. L. REV. 665, 726 n.176 (2015) (“Because bases for invalidity are limited to § 102
and § 103, inter partes reviews generally involve allegations that a patented invention is either
anticipated by, or would have been obvious in light of, the prior art. Other bases of invalidity,
such as those found in § 112 (indefiniteness, lack of written description, etc.), are
unavailable.”).
10. 36 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2012).
11. E.g., Universal Elecs. v. Universal Remote Control, 943 F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1030
(C.D. Cal. 2013) (“After a party has filed a petition requesting inter partes review, the patent
owner has three months to file a preliminary response opposing the request. 35 U.S.C. § 313;
37 C.F.R. § 42.107(b).”).
12. 36 U.S.C. § 314(b) (2012).
13. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(a) (2015) (“An inter partes review is a trial subject to the
procedures set forth in subpart A of this part.”).
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ance of the evidence.14 The PTAB must issue a final determination on the
validity of the disputed claims within one year of the PTO granting the IPR
petition.15
B. Invalidity Assertion Entities
The formation of IAEs was an unintended consequence arising from the
IPR regime. Despite being the subject of some media coverage,16 little pub-
lic information exists regarding how widespread their business model is and
how successful those who follow this model have been. No rigorous analysis
of IAEs exists in the publicly-available literature.
One of the first publicly recognized IAEs was Iron Dome, LLC. It gar-
nered attention by threatening to file an IPR against a patent owned by PAE
Chinook Licensing DE, LLC (“Chinook”) unless it was given considera-
tion.17 Iron Dome included a copy of the threatened IPR petition with its
demand letter, such that the strength of its position could be analyzed by the
patent holder.18 Chinook rebuffed the demand, and Iron Dome filed the
petition.19
Chinook responded by suing Iron Dome, asserting various causes of ac-
tion, including tortious interference with business relations and Racketeering
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act claims.20 The court eventually
held in Iron Dome’s favor, finding that the IAE’s communications were set-
tlement offers that could not lead to liability.21
This ruling disappointed some, including Robert Stoll—a former com-
missioner of patents at the USPTO—who argued that IAEs are using the
IPR process in a manner inconsistent with the intent of the law.22 Further,
one former USPTO administrative patent judge expects that the Iron Dome
ruling will incentivize the entry of more IAEs into the market.23 Assuming
that these concerns are valid, the question remains: Is the existence of IAEs
necessarily a bad thing for the patent system and the economy as a whole?
Some legislators seem to think so.
14. 35 U.S.C. § 316 (2012).
15. ACQIS, LLC v. EMC Corp., 109 F. Supp. 3d 352, 355 (D. Mass. 2015). This period
may be extended “by not more than 6 months” for good cause. 35 U.S.C. § 316 (2012).
16. Patience Haggin, Trolls Taste Own Medicine, THE RECORDER (Dec. 12, 2014), http:/
/www.therecorder.com/id=1202678962497/Trolls-Taste-Own-Medicine?slreturn=2014112820
2429.
17. First Amended Complaint, supra note 5, at 4-6, Exhibits C & D.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. First Amended Complaint, supra note 5, at 10-17.
21. Oral Argument Hearing Transcript at 44-47, Chinook Licensing DE LLC v.
RozMed LLC, (No. 14-00598).
22. Haggin, supra note 16.
23. Id.
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C. Proposed Revisions to the Inter Partes Review System
In 2015, Congress considered several proposals for patent reform. The
two primary bills included new limitations on IPR practice: the Innovation
Act of 201524 and the STRONG Patents Act of 2015.25  Both bills would
eliminate the IAE business model.
Under the Innovation Act of 2015, which is still under consideration, an
IPR petitioner must certify that it has “not demanded payment, monetary or
otherwise, from the patent owner or an affiliate of the patent owner in ex-
change for a commitment not to file a petition,” unless the petitioner has
been sued for infringement of the patent.26 Similarly, the proposed STRONG
Patents Act of 2015 provided that a petitioner must aver that a “real and
substantial controversy” exists regarding whether it infringes the subject pat-
ent.27 Each of these proposals would end the IAE business model.
As stated by Senator Chris Coons, these proposed revisions to the patent
laws were intended to “ensur[e] that a petitioner has a business or financial
reason to bring a case before the PTAB” and “to reduce incentives for priva-
teering or extortion of nuisance settlements.”28 It is not clear, however, that
these goals are laudable if the alleged “fix” actually disincentives socially
beneficial behavior. The following Section describes various possible social
benefits and legislative concerns associated with IAEs that must be ad-
dressed before appropriate patent reform can be passed.
III. IAES IN PRACTICE – A BASIS FOR CONGRESSIONAL RESTRAINT
This Section argues for Congressional restraint as it considers making
IAE activity illegal.  The first subsection discusses the base of knowledge
(or lack thereof) about the present scope of IAE activity and why this mili-
tates against legislating against IAEs. The following subsections describe
possible social benefits arising from IAE activity, including a reduction in
abusive litigation, the invalidation of ill-granted patents, and diminishment
in the cost of patent litigation.  Each subsection discusses how these benefits
arise and why these considerations weigh against legislatively ending IAE
activity in its infancy.
A. The Scope of Invalidity Assertion Entity Activity
This sub-section discusses why it is necessary to ascertain whether there
is a relevant number of entities engaging in this business model before legis-
lating on the topic of IAEs. Currently, the scope of IAE activity is not abso-
24. The Innovation Act of 2015, H.R. 9, 114th Cong. § 9(b)(1) (2015).
25. STRONG Patents Act of 2015, S. 632, 114th Cong. § 102 (2015).
26. The Innovation Act of 2015, H.R. 9, 114th Cong. § 9(b)(1) (2015).
27. STRONG Patents Act of 2015, S. 632, 114th Cong. § 102 (2015).
28. U.S. Senator Christopher Coons of Delaware, A Patent System that Works for All
Innovators, http://www.coons.senate.gov/patents.
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lutely clear. The availability of information relating to particular IAE
interactions depends on into which of two categories it falls: those IAE inter-
actions that lead to the filing of an IPR petition and those IAE interactions
that settle beforehand. As discussed below, some quantitative data are avail-
able on the former category, but due to rational interests in keeping IAE
settlements nonpublic, little data are available on the latter.
There are two parties to any IAE interaction: the IAE and the targeted
patent holder. These parties’ interests in publicizing their relationship some-
times diverge, causing the aforementioned inconsistent distribution of infor-
mation on the subject. The IAE’s financial success depends upon its
reputation as a threat to invalidate patents. This perceived hazard encourages
patent owners to pay to avoid the filing of a threatened petition. IAEs’ at-
tempts to cultivate a threatening reputation are publicly-available in the
USPTO records of filed IPR petitions.29
Relying on this publicly-available information, a recent study found that
approximately 2.5% of petitions are filed by “third parties,” which neither
use nor manufacture the subject technology.30 IAEs are a subset of this
group, and thus, represent less than 2.5% of all filed IPR petitions. Looking
to specific examples of third party filers, the study cited three exemplary
organizations: RPX Corporation, Unified Patents, Inc., and Iron Dome,
LLC.31 These companies have respectively filed seventeen petitions (against
six distinct patent holders), twenty-three petitions, and three petitions.32 To
the extent that these entities were proffered as examples of third-party IPR
practice, the limited scope of their activities suggests that IAE activity is not
presently widespread. A full empirical analysis of publicly available IAE
data is warranted, however, before legislative action on the issue would be
appropriate.
Significantly less data are available regarding IAE interactions leading
to pre-filing settlement. This is due to a patent holder’s rational emphasis on
secrecy regarding settlements it pays to IAEs. The reasons for this secrecy
are two-fold. Public recognition that a patent holder has complied with an
IAE encourages future IAE demand letters.33 Further, if the threatened IPR
petition became public, a later IAE could use the threat of filing it as lever-
age to extract a second settlement. Accordingly, no rational patent holder
29. 37 C.F.R. § 42.14 (2015) (“The record of [an IPR], including documents and things,
shall be made available to the public, except as otherwise ordered.”).
30. Brian J. Love, Inter Partes Review as a Shield for Technology Purchasers: A Re-
sponse to Gaia Bernstein’s the Rise of the End-User in Patent Litigation, 56 B.C. L. REV.
1075, 1082 n.1 (2015).
31. Id. at 1085.
32. Lexmachina.com (searched for each party as a “Lead Petitioner” on September 18,
2015).
33. Cf. Brian J. Love et al., Expanding Patent Law’s Customer Suit Exception, 93 B.U.
L. REV. 1605, 1625 (2013) (describing how settling with one rent-seeking “patent troll” may
encourage attacks from other rent-seekers who see the settling party as an easy settlement).
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would settle with an IAE without the inclusion of a confidentiality agree-
ment regarding the threated petition and the existence of the settlement. And
as such, little data regarding IAE/patent holder settlements are available.
Because little information is available about IAE activity, it is difficult
to assess the extent of IAE activity. The little information available regard-
ing IPR petitions filed by third parties (including IAEs) suggests that the
business model has not been widely adopted, but the data are not conclusive.
Such inconclusiveness raises a series of problems for legislators considering
proposed reforms to the IPR system.
Should the data be understood to mean that the IAE business model is
not widespread, then the legislature is solving a problem that doesn’t exist.
Beyond being an unnecessary use of limited legislative resources, the pro-
posed amendments create an entirely new set of unknowns. All laws have
unforeseen consequences34 (e.g., IAEs arising after passage of the IPR laws),
and if the scope of these consequences is minimal under the current IPR
regime, prudence favors not introducing new unknowns through further leg-
islation. At minimum, patience should be exercised so that it can be deter-
mined if IAE activity will grow, and if so, whether it will have a positive or
negative societal effect.
Conversely, if the scope of IAE activity is significantly wider than the
publicly available information leads one to believe, this represents a differ-
ent legislative problem. It is the height of folly for laws to be passed without
understanding all relevant information,35 yet that appears to be what is hap-
pening with IPR reform. If Congress is unaware of how many and what type
of patent holders are being targeted by IAEs, it cannot craft an appropriate
remedy to the perceived problem or determine if a social cost even exists.
Regardless of how one interprets the data regarding the scope of IAE activ-
ity, it is advisable for further research into the scope and nature of IAE
activity to be conducted before legislation addresses the issue.
B. Abusive Litigation
In recent years, abusive patent litigation has been a primary concern in
the intellectual property realm. Scholars and politicians have recognized that
questionable allegations of infringement of weak patents undermine the ba-
sic goal of patent laws.36 This subsection describes how IAE activity may
34. Howard, supra note 1, at 452.
35. See James Preston Schuck, Returning the “One” to Ohio’s “One-Subject” Rule, 28
CAP. U.L. REV. 899, 903 (2000) (“[L]egislators must be well-informed as to the contents of a
bill and its effect in order to produce quality legislation.”).
36. See, e.g., Megan M. La Belle, The Local Rules of Patent Procedure, 47 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 63, 63 (2015) (“Over the past two years, Congress proposed nearly a dozen bills aimed at
curbing patent litigation abuse.”); Mohamed Elfarra, Intersection of American Law and Tech-
nology: The Innovation Act’s Fight Against Patent Trolls, B.C. INTELL. PROP. & TECH. FORUM
1, 1 (2015) (“The economic and social burdens of frivolous litigation have led ‘academics,
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disincentivize the filing of lawsuits alleging infringement of weak patents
and why that favors not legislatively ending IAE activity at this time.
Profit-driven IAEs will target parties that are most likely to pay them a
settlement, and as discussed below, plaintiffs asserting weak patents (e.g.,
patents on inventions that were previously disclosed in the prior art37) have
significant incentives to settle with an IAE. Invalidation of an asserted patent
ends an infringement lawsuit; plaintiffs obviously want to avoid the end of
their case. Concerns about patent invalidation (and the associated end of an
infringement lawsuit) are heightened when the asserted patent is weak and
therefore unlikely to survive an IPR. Accordingly, plaintiffs asserting weak
patents have the greatest motivation to avoid IPR and in result, have the
greatest motivation to pay an IAE to not file a threatened petition.
As referenced above, a profit-driven IAE will target parties that are most
likely to pay them a settlement. It thus follows that IAEs are likely to de-
mand settlements from patent plaintiffs currently asserting weak patents.
The potential to be targeted by an IAE disincentivizes the filing of lawsuits
alleging infringement of weak patents and furthers the policy goal of limit-
ing the abusive assertion of patents that are likely invalid.
While no empirical study or exhaustive analysis has been conducted re-
garding these expectations, they are consistent with an economically rational
behavior. It is not unlikely that IAEs and patent plaintiffs would behave in
these manners to pursue their profit-driven goals. Accordingly, it makes lit-
tle sense for legislators to terminate the nascent IAE business model when it
might serve as a tool for reducing abusive patent litigation, a goal which
Congress has targeted for several years. At minimum, the legislature should
allow for a thorough analysis of whether IAEs target weak patents used in
abusive litigation before it takes action.
policymakers, and even judges to suggest that patent law[s] may have overleaped its proper
bounds, or at least become too likely to frustrate, rather than to fulfill, its constitutional pur-
pose of “promot[ing] the progress of science and useful arts.”’”) (citing John M.
Golden, “Patent Trolls” and Patent Remedies, 85 TEXAS L.J. 2011, 2112 (2007)); see also
Dana M. Muir et. al., Justice Sotomayor on the Supreme Court: A Boon for Business?, 4 VA.
L. & BUS. REV. 187, 228 (2009) (noting that patent law has recently been “the subject of
severe criticism and reform efforts”).
37. For current purposes, the term “weak” is meant to embody patents that are likely
invalid because the claimed invention was previously disclosed in the prior art, such that the
patent is likely invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 102 or 103. This is a slightly narrower definition of
“weak” than some academics may proffer, though it has no influence on the present discus-
sion. See Michael F. Werno, More Questions Than Answers? The Uncertainties Surrounding
Reverse Payment Settlements in the Post-Actavis World, 21 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 200, 204
n.33 (2015) (“One law professor describes a weak patent as one that ‘(i) is likely to be found
or held invalid; or (ii) even if valid, its claims are so narrow that they are not likely to encom-
pass many potentially competing products.’”) (citing Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., FTC v. Actavis:
The Patent-Antitrust Intersection Revisited (Tulane Univ. Sch. of Law Pub. Law and Legal
Theory Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 13-19 (2013)).
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C. Invalidation of Patents
While IAEs’ primary goals are securing settlement payments, one so-
cially beneficial externality may arise: the invalidation of ill-granted patents.
In order to coerce patent-holders to pay an IAE to not file IPR petitions,
IAEs must present a credible threat to actually invalidate the subject patent.
This perception is primarily cultivated by invalidating (or fully attempting to
invalidate) patents belonging to non-compliant parties. While invalidation of
ill-granted patents is simply a cost of doing business for IAEs, it presents a
positive externality to society at large.
All patents generate a deadweight economic loss38 by creating a limited
monopoly during the patent’s term.39 Valid patents justify this loss by having
(presumably) incentivized innovative behavior. Invalid patents do not have
such a redeeming quality to justify the deadweight loss attributable to their
associated monopoly.40 These losses show themselves in multiple ways.
Firstly, the existence of bad patents (i.e., patents that should not have
been granted) harms consumers by directly driving up prices. If a bad pat-
ent’s owner litigates the patent, many manufacturers will rationally choose
to purchase a license instead of incurring the expense of challenging the
patent’s validity.41 This licensing cost will be passed on to consumers,42 even
though the patent should never have been granted. Alternatively, if the pat-
ent holder chooses not to license their patent, they can extract supra-compet-
itive prices from consumers due to their ill-gotten monopoly.43
Further, the existence of bad patents inhibits the working of an efficient
market. In the face of a bad patent, manufacturers may forego development
of products that arguably practice the patented invention,44 which limits mar-
38. Deadweight losses have been described as such:
A deadweight loss arises whenever goods are priced in excess of marginal cost.
When price exceeds marginal cost, some consumers who value the good at more
than its marginal cost, but less than its market price, will not buy it. The deadweight
loss consists of the loss in consumer and producer surplus attributable to such lost
sales.
Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Copyright’s Price Discrimination Panacea, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 387,
456 (2008) (citing William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 Harv. L.
Rev. 1659, 1702 (1988)).
39. Bronwyn Hall et al., Prospects for Improving U.S. Patent Quality via Postgrant
Opposition, 4 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECON. 115, 118 (2004); Jay P. Kesan & Andres
Gallo, Why “Bad” Patents Survive in the Market and How Should We Change?—The Private
and Social Costs Of Patents, 55 EMORY L.J. 61, 63–64 (2006).
40. William Hubbard, The Competitive Advantage of Weak Patents, 54 B.C. L. REV.
1909, 1948 (2013).
41. Shubha Ghosh & Jay Kesan, What Do Patents Purchase? In Search of Optimal
Ignorance in the Patent Office, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 1219, 1229 (2004).
42. Kesan & Gallo, supra note 39, at 77.
43. Jay P. Kesan, Carrots and Sticks to Create a Better Patent System, 17 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 763, 767-68 (2002).
44. Hall, supra note 39, at 120.
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ket competition. Similarly, where manufacturers choose to compete with a
bad patent by designing non-infringing alternatives to introduce to the mar-
ket, the manufacturer is at a competitive disadvantage for having incurred
the research and development cost to circumvent the bad patent.45
Lastly, ill-granted patents cause misallocation of funds within the inno-
vation marketplace. Similar to any patent holder, owners of bad patents com-
pete for capital investment to build a business based on the invalid patent;
this causes misallocation of capital in two ways. The venture capitalist that
invests in a company premised on a bad patent makes a bad investment, as
future invalidation of the patent may undermine any value in the invest-
ment.46 Similarly, investment in a bad patent limits the possibility of invest-
ment in companies with valid patents, thus removing future products and
competitors from the marketplace.47
One scholar has proposed to avoid these social ills by creating a patent
bounty system, by which the public can interact with the Patent Office to
avoid the issuance of bad patents.48 It appears that the IPR process has po-
tentially (if inadvertently) implemented such an incentivization system to
invalidate bad patents post-issuance. It would seem foolhardy to amend the
IPR laws to eliminate this patent-invalidity bounty before it is given a
chance to establish whether it represents a benefit to society.
D. Limiting the Scope of Patent Litigation
One of the goals of the IPR system was to reduce costs associated with
patent litigation.49 This goal is achieved when bad patents that are currently
being litigated are invalidated though IPR. Parties need not defend them-
selves against allegations that they infringe an invalid patent. To the extent
the IAE business model necessitates invalidating bad patents, these entities
serve the goal of reducing litigation costs.
As previously explained, vigorous attempts to invalidate patents are a
necessary facet of the IAE business model. Absent this pursuit, an IAE
presents no threat to a patent holder, and the IAE has no power to negotiate a
settlement. This incentive to invalidate patents gives rise to a positive exter-
nality, namely the reduction in attorneys’ fees associated with the termina-
tion of patent lawsuits (or a portion of a multi-patent case) when ill-granted
patents are invalidated.
45. Kesan, supra note 43, at 767.
46. Ian David McClure, Commoditizing Intellectual Property Rights: The Practicability
of A Commercialized and Transparent International IPR Market and the Need for Interna-
tional Standards, 6 BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 13, 26 (2008).
47. Kesan, supra note 43, at 767.
48. John R. Thomas, Collusion and Collective Action in the Patent System: A Proposal
for Patent Bounties, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 305 (2001).
49. Gregory Dolin, Dubious Patent Reform, 56 B.C. L. REV. 881, 881 (2015).
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Likewise, an IAE’s threat to seek IPR exerts additional pressures on a
patent plaintiff to settle existing cases. The possibility of taking nothing
from litigation after an asserted patent is invalidated by an IAE must be
taken into consideration by plaintiffs considering settlement of their law-
suits. This possibility is of particular concern for patent holders asserting
particularly weak patents. This incentive to settle can be expected to shorten
the life cycle of patent cases and reduce legal costs associated with defend-
ing them.
While the exact scope of these considerations has not been fully ana-
lyzed in the literature (either empirically or from a strategic perspective), the
expected shortening of patent lawsuits and associated reduction in legal
costs is consistent with economically rational behavior. Future research
needs to be conducted on this issue to determine to what extent the policy
goal of litigation-cost reduction is served by IAEs. Until such studies have
been conducted, it seems self-defeating to legislatively end IAE activity that
may bring about this social benefit.
IV. ADDITIONAL CONCERNS RELATING TO IAE ACTIVITY
The final substantive Section addresses two points of concern regarding
IAEs and their IPR activities.  The first sub-section describes how Congress
can act against a particularly unpopular non-IAE use of the IPR system and
why such legislation need not overlap to limit IAE activity. The second sub-
section describes the potential for IAEs to act in abusive manners and how
such abuses would limit socially beneficial externalities that may arise from
the IAE business model. This subsection concludes by describing why, in
the face of a properly functioning Patent Office, these concerns are
minimized.
A. Inter Partes Review and Attempts to Influence the Stock Market
There is a business model analogous to the IAE business model that has
garnered significant media scrutiny and public backlash. Kyle Bass, head of
Hayman Capital Management, files IPR petitions to invalidate pharmaceuti-
cal patents, while simultaneously either shorting the patent owner’s stock or
investing in companies that would benefit from the invalidation.50 Unlike
IAEs, Bass does not attempt to secure settlements directly from patent hold-
ers. This controversial strategy has been attacked as an abuse of process that
50. Joseph Walker & Rob Copeland, New Hedge Fund Strategy: Dispute the Patent,
Short the Stock, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 7, 2015, 7:24 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/hedge-
fund-manager-kyle-bass-challenges-jazz-pharmaceuticals-patent-1428417408.
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is designed to manipulate stock prices.51 The allegations regarding stock
market influence cannot be levied against IAEs.
Some believe that Kyle Bass’ alleged abuses are what led to Congress’
recent proposed changes to the IPR system.52 If this is indeed the catalyst
leading to the current round of reform, the proposed legislation is unnecessa-
rily broad. For instance, under the proposed Innovation Act of 2015, an IPR
petition must certify that it does “not own and will not acquire a financial
instrument . . . that is designed to hedge or offset any decrease in the market
value of an equity security of the patent.”53 This provision, or a modified
version of this provision, would be sufficient to deter the Kyle Bass business
model.
It is unnecessary to include additional provisions prohibiting filing of a
petition by someone that has “demanded payment . . . from the patent owner
or an affiliate of the patent owner in exchange for a commitment not to file a
petition.”54 This provision is unimportant with regard to the Kyle Bass busi-
ness model, but is relevant to IAEs. And as discussed throughout this article,
prudence warrants the gathering of further information on IAEs before legis-
latively addressing them. This is true regardless of how Congress chooses to
address entities pursuing the same business strategy as Kyle Bass.
B. Potential Drawbacks
Heretofore, this Essay has described the potential for social gains due to
the existence of IAEs and research that should be undertaken to determine
the exact quantum of these benefits before passing relevant legislation. Of
course, no discussion of potential benefits would be complete without ad-
dressing possible detriments. As previously described, a primary social good
that may arise from IAEs is invalidation of patents that should not have been
granted. This subsection evaluates when IAEs might deviate from behaviors
that bring about this social benefit and what must be done to encourage IAEs
to continue producing positive externalities.
As discussed below, IAEs are least-likely to bring about socially benefi-
cial externalities if they utilize nuisance-value demand letters. This litigation
strategy has long been implemented by “patent trolls” who offer to settle an
infringement dispute of questionable merit for an amount less than what it
51. Susan Decker, Drug Makers Attack Patent Challenges, BOSTON GLOBE (July 30,
2015), https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2015/07/29/drugmakers-strike-back-kyle-bass-
blasted-over-patent-challenges/RyaN4QkiR5yNEbSZvDUXDM/story.html.
52. Acorda Fires Back at Kyle Bass’s IPR Strategy, FINALTERNATIVES (May 29, 2015,
3:01 PM), http://www.finalternatives.com/node/30947 (“In the meantime, the pharmaceutical
industry’s lobbyists in Washington are pressuring Congress to amend the law to combat what
it terms are ‘abusive’ IPR tactics.”).
53. The Innovation Act of 2015, H.R. 9, 114th Cong. § 9 (2015).
54. Id.
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would cost to defend against the allegations.55 A reasonable defendant will
commonly pay a nuisance settlement to avoid the cost of litigation and avoid
an unlikely, but financially significant, adverse judgment.
If a nuisance-value IAE business model is viable, a rationally behaving
IAE will potentially target any patent in litigation. In this situation, the
strength of an IAE’s threat is no longer the potential to invalidate a patent,
but rather, in forcing the patent-holder to incur the cost of defending its
patent. This would encourage rational IAEs to cease targeting weak patents
and focus their attentions on patents that are valuable enough to defend. This
divorces IAE activity from the social benefit of invalidating ill-granted pat-
ents (a social good). Rather, IAEs would become a socially-negative tax on
all patent litigation. As discussed below, the nuisance-value model could
viably be implemented by IAEs, but only if the Patent Office fails to apply
the proper standard in deciding whether to grant IPR petitions.
The cost of fully defending against an IPR is estimated to be between
$300,000 and $700,000.56 This significant price allows profit-driven IAEs to
spend over $45,000 to draft a petition and still be profitable if it secures a
nuisance settlement representing a portion of the cost to defend the patent.57
There is, however, an impediment to implementing this strategy. If the peti-
tion, read in light of the patent owner’s response, does not convince the
Patent Office that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner will
succeed (at least in part), the petition should be denied and no IPR initi-
ated.58 This minimizes the expense of defending against meritless allegations
of patent invalidity.
In light of the patent owner’s ability to quickly defeat meritless petitions
at an early stage, it seems that nuisance-value (and presumptively meritless)
IAE activity is unlikely to be profitable, especially in light of the significant
costs of drafting and filing an IPR petition.59 However, this determination
rests upon the significant assumption that the Patent Office will determine
that meritless petitions are not reasonably likely to invalidate a patent. If the
Patent Office fails in this task, nuisance-value IAE activity is a significant
possibility. There is some question regarding whether the Patent Office is
presently fulfilling this obligation.
55. See Ranganath Sudarshan, Nuisance-Value Patent Suits: An Economic Model and
Proposal, 25 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 159, 162 (2009).
56. Haggin, supra note 16.
57. 1 ECKSTROM’S LICENSING IN FOREIGN & DOMESTIC OPERATIONS 4 app. 4L. This
calculus obviously oversimplifies the costs of engaging in IAE activity, but it is sufficient for
current purposes.
58. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2012).
59. The respective costs to draft and file an IPR petition are $46,000 (estimated) and
$23,000 (a portion of which may be refunded if the petition is denied). ECKSTROM’S, supra
note 57, at 9, 19.
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Since IPR began in 2012, the Patent Office has granted 1,457 of 2,059
petitions (70.8%).60 This high rate of success for petitioners before the Pat-
ent Office has been explained in two manners: (1) Petitioners target only
particularly bad patents, and thus, it is not surprising that these patents fare
poorly; and (2) The system is inherently anti-patent, which is shown through
a high success rate for petitions.61
If the former explanation is correct, then there is little likelihood that
nuisance IAE activity will occur. The Patent Office will not institute IPRs
based on meritless petitions, and thus, the patent holder can expect that legal
fees associated with such petitions (including petitions associated with nui-
sance-value IAEs) will be minimal. Thus, there is little incentive for a patent
holder to settle a nuisance value case for an amount that would prove profit-
able for an IAE (i.e., an amount greater than the cost to draft a petition), and
no reasonable IAE would pursue the nuisance-value strategy.
If the correct explanation is that the IPR system is inherently anti-patent,
then nuisance-value IAEs may profitably exist. Assuming that petitions are
likely to be granted against any patent (due to an anti-patent bias), a targeted
patent holder can expect that it will expend between $300,000 and $700,000
to defend a full IPR.62 At this expected cost, a patent holder may rationally
choose to settle a nuisance-value IPR case for a sum that is profitable to an
IAE. This encourages the pursuit of a nuisance-value IAE business model.
There is currently little evidence of widespread nuisance-value IAE ac-
tivity. Further, there is no conclusive study showing that the Patent Office is
not rejecting low-quality petitions that could be used by nuisance-value
IAEs. However, if meritless petitions can be used as a tool to collect nui-
sance-value settlements, then the social benefit of invalidating ill-granted
patents is undermined. In that scenario, IAEs will rationally target any valua-
ble patent (strong or weak) because the strength of the patent would not be
relevant to whether the IAE could secure a nuisance-value payment.
If the USPTO efficiently denies meritless petitions, then the above-de-
scribed benefits from IAE activity (i.e., invalidation of ill-granted patents)
are still possible. IAEs will not be able to engage in nuisance-value activity
and will have to focus their attentions on weak (ill-granted) patents. There is,
at this time, no conclusive study on this point. In light of this uncertainty and
60. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board Statistics (Aug.
31, 2015), at 7 http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2015-08-31%20PTAB.pdf.
This data excludes petitions that were joined with others and petitions that settled before insti-
tution or denial. For purposes of this data, a partial grant is considered a grant.
61. Ann E. Motl, Inter Partes Review: Ensuring Effective Patent Litigation Through
Estoppel, 99 MINN. L. REV. 1975, 1990 (2015). These positions were specifically discussing
the invalidation rate during IPR at a time when the rate of invalidation was higher than it is at
present, but the sentiments are still applicable to the present grant rate for IPR petitions.
62. Haggin, supra note 16.
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as described throughout this article, further research is appropriate before
Congress legislates on IAEs without access to all relevant facts.
V. CONCLUSION
This Essay is not the terminal work on whether IAE activity can prove
socially beneficial. Rather, it is the first exposition on potential, even likely,
social gains that may be attributed to the business model. As discussed
herein, IAEs may undermine abusive patent litigation, reduce the costs of
defending against assertions of patent infringement, and serve the public by
invalidating ill-granted patents. With this in mind, it is prudent to delay
judgment on IAEs while further critical analysis of these nascent business
entities and their future behavior in the marketplace can be evaluated. It is
therefore necessary that Congress be patient in considering legislation that
would terminate IAEs as a participant on the patent landscape.
